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Global momentum towards a "Nuclear-Weapon-Free World" (NWFW) has been growing since the 
end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, in the international community, it is still difficult to discern a 
unified voice about how to approach a NWFW, utilising international law. This is possibly because of 
ongoing disagreement between nuclear weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon States 
(NNWS), particularly the non-aligned countries. The issue revolves around the understanding of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), especially art 6 of that treaty which sets out the contracting 
parties' nuclear disarmament obligations. Reflecting the discord between the NWS and NNWS, this 
article sheds light on the gap between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA)'s perceptions of, and actions taken towards, the realisation of a 
NWFW. The article calls for the minimisation of disharmony by reinvestigating the roles of the United 
Nations system and the NPT in establishing a NWFW, and through observing the UNGA's current 
position. 
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I INTRODUCTION – DISHARMONY BETWEEN THE UNSC AND 
UNGA? 
Global momentum towards nuclear disarmament has been growing since the end of the Cold War. 
This sentiment seems to have culminated in United States President Barack Obama's 2009 speech in 
Prague, in which he discussed the necessity of realising a "Nuclear-Weapon-Free World" (NWFW).1 
Nevertheless, in the international community, it is still difficult to formulate a unified voice about how 
to approach a NWFW utilising international law. This is possibly because of the ongoing 
disagreement between nuclear weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS), 
particularly the non-aligned countries, about their understanding of the raison d'être of art 6 of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968 (NPT), which stipulates the nuclear disarmament obligations 
of contracting parties to the NPT.2 
The emerging gap between perceptions of and action towards a NWFW between the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is clearly 
visible, and reflects the discord between the NWS and NNWS. In fact, the UNGA passed a number of 
follow-up resolutions to the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) 1996 advisory opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996 Advisory Opinion),3 demanding a faster 
realisation of the tenets of a nuclear weapons convention banning the use and possession of nuclear 
weapons, in accordance with the terms of art 6 of the NPT.4 In contrast, in UNSC Resolution 1887, 
  
1  Barack Obama, President of the United States of America "Remarks of President Barack Obama" (Speech to 
the people of Prague, Hradčany Square, Prague, 5 April 2009).  
2  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 729 UNTS 161 (opened for signature 1 July 1968, 
entered into force 5 March 1970) [NPT]. Article 6 stipulates as follows: 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control. 
3  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 [1996 Advisory 
Opinion]. 
4  See United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] resolutions: Advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 51/45 M, A/Res/51/45 (1997); 
Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons GA Res 52/38 O, A/Res/52/38 (1998); Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 53/77 W, A/RES/53/77 
(1999); Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 54/54 Q, A/Res/54/54 (2000); Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 55/33 X, 
A/Res/55/33 (2001); Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 56/24 S, A/Res/56/24 (2002); Follow-up to the advisory 
opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons  GA 
 TOWARDS A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE WORLD 619 
adopted in 2009, the UNSC stated that a NWFW should be accomplished "in accordance with the 
goals of the [NPT], in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of 
undiminished security for all".5 That means that the UNSC prioritises non-proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) rather than an immediate and complete nuclear disarmament. Thus, the 
disharmony between the UNSC and UNGA must be urgently resolved. 
In this article, four points are analysed to clarify the roles of the United Nations (UN) system and 
the NPT in establishing a NWFW. First, the history of the failure of multilateral disarmament 
negotiations between States in the League of Nations (LON), the arms control mechanism of the UN 
system, and the status of the NPT on the road to a NWFW, are briefly discussed. Second, the 
differences in understanding of the international law surrounding the use and disarmament of nuclear 
weapons by the NWS – which are also the permanent members of the UNSC – and their allies are 
investigated. Third, the international law surrounding nuclear weapons, as understood by the majority 
of the UN (mainly non-aligned States) is discussed, through reference to the 1996 Advisory Opinion6 
and the 2007 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (2007 MNWC or MNWC) proposed by Costa Rica 
and Malaysia.7 Fourth, the crucial reason for disharmony – that the aforementioned UNSC view, 
which prioritises nuclear non-proliferation, is not shared with the UNGA, or at least with the 
non-aligned countries – is discussed. After that, the apparently diminishing trend of disharmony 
  
Res 57/85, A/Res/57/85 (2003); Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 58/46, A/Res/58/46 (2004); Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons GA Res 59/83, A/Res/59/83 (2004); Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court 
of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 60/76, A/Res/60/76 (2006); 
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons GA Res 61/83, A/Res/61/83 (2006); Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 62/39, A/Res/62/39 
(2008); Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 63/49, A/Res/63/49 (2009); Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 64/55, 
A/Res/64/55 (2010); Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 65/76, A/Res/65/76 (2011); Follow-up to the advisory 
opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons GA 
Res 66/46, A/Res/66/46 (2012).  
The de facto Nuclear Weapon States [NWS] (such as India), and the States causing proliferation concerns 
(such as Iran), are some of the States that proposed these resolutions. The Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea [DPRK] also became one of these States in 2012. 
5  Resolution 1887 (2009) SC Res 1887, S/Res/1887 (2009) at 1. 
6  1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 3. 
7  See Letter dated 17 December 2007 from the Permanent Representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General A/62/650 (2008) [2007 MNWC or MNWC]. 
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between the UNSC and the UNGA will be discussed. In conclusion, the cause of, and a solution to, 
disharmony, will be examined. 
II NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: ROLES OF THE UN SYSTEM 
AND NPT 
According to dominant logic, disarmament can only be achieved where States are bound by 
consenting to obey limitations on the use and possession of certain armaments. Is the UN system, in 
practice, following that understanding and logic? Are the member States of the UN allowed to freely 
decide their qualitative and quantitative priorities with regard to armaments, particularly where the 
right of self-defence is invoked? This Part briefly analyses the roles of the UN system and NPT in 
achieving nuclear disarmament. It focuses on the following points: first, why a general disarmament 
negotiation failed in the LON; second, how the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) was 
designed to regulate disarmament through collective security; and finally, what kind of status is given 
to the NPT on the road to a NWFW. 
A Failure of Disarmament in the LON 
Several reasons might be proffered for why the LON could not achieve general disarmament. If 
one of the main reasons for that failure is Germany's rearmament, investigating the history of 
disarmament negotiations at that time may be beneficial for understanding the deadlock situation of 
the nuclear disarmament process existing within the UN today. 
After World War I, Germany was nearly disarmed under the Inter-Allied Commissions of 
Military Control. The Inter-Allied Commissions had "the duty of seeing to the complete execution of 
the delivery, destruction, demolition and rendering things useless to be carried out at the expense of 
the German Government",8 as per pt V of the Treaty of Versailles 1919 (TOV).9 The main reason for 
enacting this Part was "to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all 
nations" in the LON, so that Germany was required to undertake "strictly to observe the military, 
naval and air clauses" of the TOV.10 The near disarmament of Germany implies the fact that the 
  
8  Treaty of Versailles 225 CTS 188 (signed 28 June 1919, entered into force 10 January 1920), art 204 [TOV]. 
See also pt V at Preamble. 
9  According to Hans J Morgenthau (Kenneth W Thompson (ed)) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace (Brief ed, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1993) at 438: 
This disarmament [under the 1919 Versailles Treaty] was quantitative as well as qualitative and 
so thorough as to make it impossible for Germany to wage again a war similar in kind to the First 
World War.  
10  TOV, above n 8, pt V at Preamble. 
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LON originally took a discriminatory approach toward achieving general disarmament.11 Even 
though Germany was allowed to be a member of the LON with a permanent seat on the Council of the 
LON under the 1925 Locarno Treaties,12  Germany was not invited to the Naval Limitations 
Conference 1932–1934, but only to the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament meeting in 1931.13 
In the Preparatory Commission meeting, although the French tried to remain a signatory to the TOV 
by proposing their own disarmament plan, Germany consistently opposed the plan on the basis of 
equality of rights and obligations with other States.14 Although Germany accepted the draft of a 
general disarmament convention in the Preparatory Commission meeting (though with many 
  
11  Because of the collective security response to the "covenant-breaking State" (including a military sanction 
led by the Council members) as stipulated in art 16, all members of the League of Nations [LON] would 
consider "the reduction of [their] national armaments to the lowest point consistent with [their] national 
safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations", as per the Covenant of the LON 
1 LNTS 403 (signed 28 June 1919, entered into force 10 January 1920), pt I at art 8. 
12  Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy 54 LNTS 291 
(signed 16 October 1925, entered into force 14 September 1926), art 10: this article only mentioned that 
Germany could be "a Member of the League". In addition to this, on 31 January 1927 the Inter-Allied 
Commission of Military Control came to an end. But see TOV, above n 8, pt V at art 164, which stipulates:  
Germany agrees that after she has become a member of the League of Nations the armaments 
fixed in [Table No II annexed to section V, with the exception of an optional increase not 
exceeding one-twenty-fifth part for small arms and one-fiftieth part for guns] shall remain in 
force until they are modified by the Council of the League. Furthermore she hereby agrees 
strictly to observe the decisions of the Council of the League on this subject.  
Serious doubts as to how Germany (with a permanent seat on the Council) could be controlled by the LON 
might have arisen at the time. 
13  This denial to participate implies that pt V, art 164 of the TOV, above n 8, was strictly applied and 
implemented by the major member States even after Germany was recognised as a "permanent" member of 
the LON. 
14  An official German delegate, Count JH Bernstorff, claimed that Germany "cannot recognise anything as a 
first [general] Disarmament Convention unless the solution which it provides is just and equitable, and pays 
regard to the security of all States": LON Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament 
Conference, Entrusted with the Preparation for the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of 
Armaments (League of Nations, Geneva, 1931) series x, pt 4 at 262. An official delegate of the British 
Empire, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, replied that "the proposal adumbrated by … Bernstorff … is, roughly 
speaking, to apply the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles to all the world" but "a step will be 
taken by the first Disarmament Conference [not] in the direction of … [the] German proposal": Documents of 
the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at 508. Germany's attitude was possible 
because Prime Minister Stresemann originally desired to change the LON from "an instrument of the 
victorious powers into a true League of all nations" which was based on the principle of universality": Georg 
Schwarzenberger The League of Nations and World Order: A Treatise on the Principle of Universality in the 
Theory and Practice of the League of Nations (Constable, London, 1936) at 78–79. 
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reservations, including an intimation of failure of the World Disarmament Conference)15 the new 
government under the Hitler regime eventually withdrew from the Conference and the LON, insisting 
that rearming "defensive" weapons must be equally and immediately allowed for Germany.16 Thus, 
the effort taken towards achieving general disarmament under the LON was stalemated due to the 
procedure in place under the Covenant of the LON,17 and the LON finally collapsed because of this 
failure of disarmament. 
Through this historical analysis, two points can be made regarding the reasons for failure: first, 
general disarmament was blocked by the consensus procedure and the members emphatically 
claiming sovereign equality and self-defence; second, there was a lack of an effective sanction 
mechanism relating to arms control. 
B Arms Control Under the UN's Collective Security 
To avoid the failures of the LON era, the UN has adopted a new disarmament approach by 
establishing an international enforcement mechanism reaching beyond the sovereignty of States. 
During the period of negotiating the UN system, the 1943 Declaration of Four Nations on General 
Security (Joint Four-Nation Declaration) 18  introduced a doctrine through which international 
policemen "should forcibly disarm Germany and Japan … and also assure that no other states should 
develop sufficient armaments to threaten world peace".19 Further, these policemen:20 
  
15  The main reason for their reservation was that the "German Government must reject the draft, which … is 
full of the most serious and fundamental defects and omissions [of the proposals]" and "this so complex 
instrument lacks that which is essential – namely, a firm determination to disarm": LON Documents of the 
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, ibid, at 409. Germany also stated that (LON 
Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, ibid, at 597): 
… as a starting point a state of disarmament resulting from the Conference such that no country 
would be powerful enough to be in a position to assert its strength against that of the League of 
Nations.  
16  See Indiana University "Chronology 1933" (October 2002) League of Nations Photo Archive 
<www.indiana.edu>. 
17  The disarmament procedure stipulated in the Covenant of the LON, above n 11, at art 8, is that first, the 
Council of the League was to "formulate plans for [the] reduction [of national armaments] for the 
consideration and action of the several Governments"; second, "these plans shall have been adopted by the 
several Governments", probably by consensus as per art 5; and third, "the limits of armaments therein fixed 
shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council".  
18  Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security 38 AJIL 7 (signed 30 October 1943) [Joint Four-Nation 
Declaration]. 
19  Bernhard G Bechhoefer Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Brookings Institution, Washington, 1961) 
at 18. Bechhoefer's interpretation relied on the word "practicable" in the Joint Four-Nation Declaration, ibid, 
at [7], which stipulated that the signatories would work towards "a practicable general agreement with 
respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period". This declaration was based on the Atlantic 
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 … should not disarm after the war, but should continue to be in a position to maintain international pace 
against any aggressor until the [UN] itself had the military strength to take over the task.  
This approach indicates that a feasible and effective disarmament can be realised only by taking a 
strict arms control approach, backed by those powerful countries that are responsible for and have the 
capacity to maintain international peace and security. Admittedly, however, arms control under the 
UN system may prima facie discriminate between the UNSC permanent members and the other 
members.21 
If the UN Charter is recognised, then the international legal order of peace and security is backed 
by the international security organisation (namely the UNSC), and it may not be difficult to accept an 
idea broached by Hans Kelsen regarding the relationship between disarmament and security. Kelsen 
emphasised that any disarmament could not be achieved without collective security.22 Recognising 
the UN Charter as "the new general international law",23 Kelsen put forward a positive interpretation 
of the UN system, saying that "the Members of the United Nations may be subjected to much stricter 
obligtaions (sic) with respect to their disarmament than the Members of the League were". 24 
Although "the obligation [of disarmament per se] is established by a treaty concluded by the Member 
  
Charter 204 LNTS 382 (issued 14 August 1941), art 8, which noted that "all of the nations of the world … 
must come to the abandonment of the use of force", and, "pending the establishment of a wider and 
permanent system of general security" to disarm aggressor nations, must "aid and encourage all other 
practicable measure which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments".  
20  Bechhoefer, ibid, at 23. 
21  The UN's collective security system backed by the powerful countries, namely the permanent members of 
the UNSC, is essentially a discriminatory relationship because it looks like the relationship between police 
and civilians. This point is developed further in this section. 
22  Hans Kelsen Collective Security Under International Law (The Lawbook Exchange, New Jersey, 2001) at 
197–198. 
23  According to Hans Kelsen "Sanctions in International Law Under the Charter of the United Nations" (1946) 
31 Iowa L Rev 499 at 502: "the most striking difference between the old and the new general international 
law" is that "[t]he procedure for the application of these sanctions is completely centralized, and thus the 
principle of self-help eliminated." Basically, Kelsen describes the historical evolution of the international law 
of peace as a centralisation of the forces. See also Hans Kelsen Principles of International Law (The 
Lawbook Exchange, New Jersey, 2003) at 3–89. 
24  Hans Kelsen The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (The 
Lawbook Exchange, New Jersey, 2000) at 105. 
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with the Organization",25 since "the [UNSC] is completely free in its determination",26 the fact 
that:27  
… a Member who refuses to accept the plan providing for a reduction of its armament may, in the opinion 
of the [UNSC], constitute a threat to the peace and consequently lead directly or indirectly … to an 
enforcement action.  
This means that, pursuant to art 39 of the UN Charter, "the [UNSC] has the power to enforce its plans 
for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, which may provide for 
disarmament".28 Under the UN Charter, the UNSC may be authorised to fulfil a sort of legislative and 
judicial function with regard to disarmament, as a matter of international peace and security, and 
members – and even non-members – of the UN in general have an obligation to obey any arms control 
measures agreed to by the UNSC. In other words, the decision of the members of the UN either to 
accept or refuse to accept the plan for disarmament proposed by the UNSC and also the "disarmament 
treaty" inspired by the plan is circumstantial. This is because the "wording of the Charter referring to 
[the] action does not imply the idea of an obligation"29 and "any act of the [UNSC] or [UNGA]" 
cannot summon the member States but is considered only as a "'recommendation' and/or 'plan'".30 
Thus, any UNSC documents and treaties on the regulation of armaments may have a quasi-binding 
power over all members of the UN and even on the non-members, unless these documents are 
recognised as a significant international effort to maintain peace and security by the five permanent 
members of the UN. 
In the sphere of arms control under collective security, understanding and applying international 
law in a contractual manner will generally not marry with reality. For instance, by adopting UNSC 
Resolution 1718,31 "[w]hile the DPRK may have been legally entitled to leave the NPT, it cannot 
lawfully escape the bounds of the Charter regarding international peace and security".32 According to 
Andreas Paulus and Jörn Müller, "[s]overeign equality may … in itself not constitute a limit to the 
  
25  Ibid. 
26  Kelsen "Sanctions in International Law Under the Charter of the United Nations", above n 23, at 521. 
27  Kelsen The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, above n 24, at 106. 
28  Ibid. According to Kelsen, the phrase "the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments" refers 
to "international treaties concerning disarmament concluded among the Member States": Kelsen "Sanctions 
in International Law Under the Charter of the United Nations", above n 23, at 521, n 12. 
29   Kelsen "Sanctions in International Law Under the Charter of the United Nations", above n 23, at 522. 
30  Kelsen "Sanctions in International Law Under the Charter of the United Nations", above n 23, at 521. 
31  Resolution 1718 (2006) SC Res 1718, S/Res/1718 (2006). 
32  Andreas L Paulus and Jörn Müller "Security Council Resolution 1718 on North Korea's Nuclear Test" (2006) 
10 ASIL Insights at Conclusion. 
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Council's powers", and "[t]hat is what the Charter system was designed for".33 Further, the UNSC, in 
condemning India and Pakistan for conducting nuclear tests in 1998, has only focused on whether 
those States "challenge[d] … international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons".34 In addition to this, the UNSC clearly stated that these de 
facto countries "cannot have the status of a [NWS]", in "accordance with the [NPT]";35 nevertheless 
they conducted nuclear tests to obtain such status. Thus, some scholars have come to realise that the 
UNSC possesses a sort of judicial and legislative power to maintain nuclear non-proliferation in the 
post-Cold War era, arguing that there has emerged "a new architecture for the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons"36 or that the UNSC's resolutions have gained "a quasi jus cogens quality".37 
Although there exists an argument that there is a logical possibility of ultra vires action being taken by 
the UNSC, in practice none of the members have obviously criticised and challenged UNSC action.38 
Whether the UNSC takes action to penalise States or not is primarily dependent on the considerations 
of each of the five permanent members of the UNSC. 
C Status of the NPT on the Road to a NWFW 
The history of nuclear weapons began during World War II as an arms race between Nazi 
Germany and the Allies – such as the United States –and then was taken to the next stage by two 
atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.39 The next stage was a nuclear arms race between 
two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and also the proliferation of nuclear 
  
33  Ibid. 
34  Resolution 1172 (1998) SC Res 1172, S/Res/1172 (1998) at 1. 
35  Ibid, at 3. See also Resolution 1718 (2006), above n 31. 
36  According to Jack I Garvey "A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (2008) 12 J 
Conflict Security Law 339 at 355, such new architecture can be recognised because the United Nations 
Security Council [UNSC] has consistently stated that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a 
"threat to peace, triggering … Chapter VII" of the Charter of the United Nations [UN Charter].  
37  Peter Hulsroj "Jus Cogens and Disarmament" (2006) 46 Indian J Intl L 1 at 9, has argued that "law-making by 
the Security Council has a quasi jus cogens quality", even if some of the Security Council's resolutions 
merely use the words "demand" or "call upon", without mentioning ch VII of the UN Charter.  
38  Two "law-making" resolutions adopted by the UNSC under ch VII of the UN Charter (Resolution 1373 
(2001) SC Res 1373, S/Res/1373 (2001) and Resolution 1540 (2004) SC Res 1540, S/Res/1540 (2004)), are 
considered to be ultra vires and ineffective: see Eric Rosand "The Security Council As "Global Legislator": 
Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?" (2004) 28 Fordham Intl L J 542 at 545. But in practice, these resolutions are 
implemented even by those members of the UN who criticised them, such as India. 
39  Joseph M Siracusa Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 
12–13. 
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umbrellas40 and technologies linked to the military alliances backed by them; including NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. This hostile relationship bred, internationally, some nuclear threshold States.41 
Thus, a universal and complete nuclear disarmament was hard to achieve immediately. The 
international community lost its first chance to achieve a NWFW due to Cold War politics. 
Nevertheless, three NWS, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, 
successfully led international negotiations to prevent other States (except France and China), from 
making nuclear weapons and explosive devices, while internationally disseminating nuclear 
technologies in the name of "atoms for peace". By adopting two international instruments, the Statute 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1957 (IAEA)42 and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
1963 (PTBT),43 it became obvious that a sort of technology denial regime led by the NWS (and their 
allies with advanced nuclear technology) was gradually being established in order to prevent the 
further emergence of States possessing nuclear weapons. The latter instrument obviously introduced a 
discriminatory approach since it did not ban the NWS from conducting underground nuclear 
explosive tests.44 Despite taking a discriminatory approach, many countries accepted the PTBT and 
abandoned their attempts to make nuclear weapons, instead obtaining international cooperation for 
the peaceful use of atomic energy for their economic development, and obtaining positive and 
negative security assurances from the NWS. 
It is fair to say that the NPT was adopted as "a step towards the achievement of general and 
complete [nuclear] disarmament". 45  Yet its main purpose was undoubtedly "to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons" because "the proliferation … would endanger the security of all 
States and make more difficult the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective 
  
40  The nuclear umbrella is a sort of security assurance by the States possessing nuclear weapons to help their 
allies by utilising security measures to deter aggression. Thus, the assurance could be provided tangibly by 
placing their nuclear weapons in the territories of allies in advance, or intangibly by a promise to provide 
them in a state of emergency. 
41  "Threshold States" refers to the times at which the States are either secretly manufacturing nuclear weapons 
or are attempting to do so. 
42  Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] 276 UNTS 3 (signed 23 October 1956, entered 
into force 29 July 1957). 
43  Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water 480 UNTS 43 
(opened for signature 5 August 1963, entered into force 10 October 1963). 
44  Later, this approach was also implemented in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 35 ILM 1439 
(opened for signature 24 September 1996, not yet in force) [CTBT], which did not ban non-explosive nuclear 
tests like subcritical nuclear and computer-simulating tests. This was technically able to be done only by the 
NWS at the time. 
45  Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 2028 (XX), A/Res/2028 (XX) (1965) at 3 [Resolution 2028 
(XX)]. 
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international control".46 Since the People's Republic of China (PRC) was recognised as the sole 
legitimate Government of the Chinese State by the UN, the definition of the NWS under art 9 of the 
NPT indicates that States possessing nuclear weapons must be limited to the permanent members of 
the UNSC.47 Thus, the NPT is not per se a treaty for pursuing the absolute abolition of nuclear 
weapons, but may be categorised as a treaty for "partial disarmament"48 under collective security.49 
This fact might allow the NPT to be considered as regulating armaments – or might be called "arms 
control" of nuclear weapons – in pursuing its goal of total disarmament under the UN system. 
Moreover, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) have been established as "regional arms control 
(or disarmament) measures"50 which are a supplementary arrangement of the NPT "to assure the total 
absence of nuclear weapons in … respective territories" constituted of NNWS,51 and which are also a 
regional security arrangement under ch VIII of the UN Charter. These NWFZ are backed by the NWS' 
  
46  Ibid, at 2. 
47  Article 9(3) of the NPT, above n 2, stipulates that a NWS is "one which has manufactured and exploded a 
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967". The People's Republic of China 
conducted a nuclear explosive test before this time. 
48  If Kelsen's classification is correct, a partial nuclear disarmament means "an internationalisation of [nuclear 
weapons] or of the production, possession, and use of such weapons". His presupposition is that "[a]s long as 
[the] sanction [is] to be executed by the members of the [security] organization employing their own national 
armed forces, no real disarmament is possible" and "[i]f the abolition were extended [to the execution of 
international sanctions], [nuclear weapons] would be prohibited even in the execution of international 
sanctions": see Kelsen Principles of International Law, above n 23, at 203–204. 
49  In fact, the NPT, above n 2, (commended by Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons GA Res 
2373 (XXII), A/Res/2373 (XXII) (1968) [Resolution 2373]) was opened for signature after the adoption of 
Question relating to measures to safeguard non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons SC Res 255 (1968), S/Res/255 (1968) [Resolution 255], which 
stipulates a positive security assurance for the use of nuclear weapons by the NWS, for the NNWS who are 
party to Resolution 255; and further, three depository States – the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Soviet Russia – had signed Resolution 255 on 1 July of the same year. The draft of Resolution 255 was 
originally proposed by the States on 7 March 1968 and was published as Annex II of the Conference of the 
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament Report to the UNGA and the Disarmament Commission. See 
United Nations "Procedural History: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons New York, 12 
June 1968" (2008) Audiovisual Library of International Law <http://untreaty.un.org>. However, four 
non-permanent members, Algeria, Brazil, India and Pakistan, abstained from voting due to discrimination of 
the collective security between the parties and non-parties: see United Nations Security Council Official 
Meeting Records S/PV.1433 (1968). 
50  South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 1445 UNTS 177 (opened for signature 6 August 1985, entered into 
force 11 December 1988), 178; and African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty 35 ILM 698 (opened for 
signature 11 April 1996, entered into force 15 July 2009). 
51  NPT, above n 2, at art 7. 
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security assurance provided through the protocols of respective treaties. 52  These regional and 
supplementary arrangements have significantly contributed toward some threshold States abandoning 
their nuclear military activities. 
There is a remarkable interpretation of the NPT which argues that the so-called "three pillars" of 
the NPT (nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
between the NWS and NNWS)53 must be equally interpreted and implemented; in other words, "none 
of the pillars should be presumed to be of higher prioritization",54 since that is the "grand bargain"55 
or raison d'être of the scheme. Is it possible to accept the three pillar interpretation under the NPT and 
will this interpretation actually be followed by the member States? This interpretation is based on the 
fact that UNGA Resolution 202856 states that "[t]he [NPT] should embody an acceptable balance of 
mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers".57 In fact, the final 
documents of the NPT Review Conferences58 which emphasise nuclear disarmament have been 
variously adopted by consensus, as a result of dealing with the three pillars in a certain balanced 
  
52  The NWFW treaties have a protocol assuring the NWS' negative security assurance. But that negative 
security assurance remains a conditional undertaking. For instance, at the time of ratifying the Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean 634 UNTS 326 (opened for signature 
14 February 1967, entered into force 22 April 1968), the United States' declaration of 11 June 1971 
(President Richard Nixon Proclamation by President Nixon on Ratification of the Additional Protocol to the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, June 11, 1971 (Department of State, 
Washington DC, 2007) at I) stated that the United States would: 
… have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a 
nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding 
obligations under Article I of the treaty. 
See also CTBT, above n 44, at Preamble. 
53  Daniel H Joyner Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 
at 19. 
54  Ibid, at 32. 
55  According to Joyner, above n 53, at 27, the "grand bargain" of the NPT is "[the] quid pro quo relationship of 
differential and reciprocal obligations between [the NWS] and [NNWS]".  
56  Resolution 2028 (XX), above n 45. See also ibid. 
57  Resolution 2028 (XX), above n 45, at 3. 
58  For instance, Decision 2: Principles And Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in 
1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons: Final Document NPT/CONF.1995/31 (Vol I) (1995) at 9–12; 2000 NPT Review Conference of 
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document 
NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II) (2000) at 13–15. 
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manner. 59  Further, demands by the non-aligned movement (NAM) countries – for instance 
negotiating for a nuclear weapons convention – has been noted in the final documents of the NPT 
Review Conferences. Nevertheless, it seems that the three pillars interpretation mentioned above is 
not yet shared by the NWS and their allies, since they retain the stance that nuclear non-proliferation 
must be prioritised under the NPT. 
Actual nuclear disarmament negotiations continuing at the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva (which is the multilateral disarmament forum) have been stuck due to a lack of trust among 
the members.60 In the post-Cold War era, the main cause of lack of trust has remained disagreement 
between the NWS and NNWS. For instance, the final draft of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty 1996 (CTBT)61 was rejected by the Disarmament Conference in 1996 as a result of India's 
veto. There was a strong perception that any discriminatory process in line with the NPT would not 
contribute to nuclear disarmament, as per the procedure of consensus voting.62 Any "step-by-step" 
process suggested by the Conference, such as the emphasis of the NWS and their allies on the priority 
of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty's (FMCT)63 negotiation, is far from obtaining the approval of 
the NAM countries, including de facto NWS. This is due to the priority given to the earlier realisation 
of a nuclear weapons convention supporting equal nuclear disarmament between the NWS and 
NNWS, including the non-parties to the NPT.64 
  
59  However, according to Norman A Wulf "Misinterpreting the NPT" (September 2011) Arms Control 
Association <www.armscontrol.org> "a careful balancing among [the three pillars] is a political imperative. 
It is not, however, a legal imperative". He further states that "the quid pro quo [contract] for [the NNWS'] 
adherence" was not "created by the negotiating process [of the NPT]" and "the primary object and purpose … 
is … nonproliferation of nuclear weapons". Thus, the NPT just "obligate[s the NWS] to make good-faith 
efforts toward disarmament", otherwise "illegal nuclear-weapon states' policies reliance in part on the three 
pillars being equal and on the existence of a contract" would be justified.  
60  The Conference on Disarmament: Issues and Insights (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 
Geneva, 2012) at 1. 
61  CTBT, above n 44. 
62  Arundhati Ghose "Maintaining the moratorium – a de facto CTBT" (2006) 2 Disarmament Forum 23. 
63  Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices GA 
Res 48/75 L, A/Res/48/75 (1993). 
64  Such a claim by the NAM countries was broadly seen in the debate on Australia's draft resolution in the First 
Committee in 2011. It was suggested that the procedure of consensus voting be changed in the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva and so on, in order to increase ease of negotiation. See Other Texts on 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Middle East, Nuclear Proliferation Risk, Regional Disarmament in Africa, Latin 
America and Caribbean, Asia and Pacific GA/DIS/3444 (2011); and Some Point to 'Misuse of Consensus 
Rule': Others Say 'Broken Machinery Won't Fix Itself', Ask General Assembly to Tell Conference on 
Disarmament 'Time Running Out' GA/DIS/3445 (2011). According to Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu "Dealing 
with extra-NPT actors and non-state actors" in Jane Boulden, Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G Weiss (eds) 
The United Nations and Nuclear Orders (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2009) 210 at 219–220: 
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The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has caused confusion for the nuclear arms control 
effort. This is because the Conference works by consensus among its members, including non-parties 
to the NPT. For instance, the CTBT's entry-into-force clause included even non-parties to the NPT, 
amongst those 44 States whose ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force. The purpose 
was to "[attract] the adherence of all States to this Treaty" and "contribute effectively to the 
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear 
disarmament".65 Ironically, the entry-into-force clause allows non-parties to the NPT, such as India 
and Pakistan, not only to evade signing and ratifying the CTBT, but also to legitimise their claim of 
pursuing equal nuclear disarmament with the two NWS that are not ratifying it – the United States and 
China. Even the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the State that declared its 
withdrawal from the NPT, has adopted the same stance. This fact indicates that the CTBT does not 
necessarily invoke a strict NPT approach, and a nuclear disarmament negotiation in the Conference 
might have serious difficulty in breaking through. 
Thus, there is significant confusion among members of the UN as to how to use the NPT and its 
supplementary regimes (such as the CTBT and FMCT) on the road to a NWFW. 
III DIFFERENCES IN UNDERSTANDING OF THE USE, 
POSSESSION AND DISARMAMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The deadlock situation at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva derives from differences in 
understanding of the NPT, specifically art 6, which stipulates the nuclear disarmament obligations of 
contracting parties and also the role of the UN system on the road towards a NWFW. In this Part, these 
differences in understanding are briefly discussed. 
A The NWS and Their Allies: Retaining the NPT 
The NWS' present understanding of the NPT may be influenced by the use and possession of their 
nuclear weapons, which is legally allowed under the NPT. Further influences include: UNSC 
Resolutions 255 and 984, 66  which stipulate "conditional" 67  positive and negative security 
  
Led by India, a number of [the NAM] countries had been linking the commencement of [the] 
FMCT negotiations to concurrent negotiations on a timetable for nuclear disarmament, which 
the five [NWS] refused to take seriously.  
65  CTBT, above n 44, at Preamble (emphasis added). 
66  Resolution 255, above n 49; Resolution 984 (1995) SC Res 984, S/Res/984 (1995).  
67  The five permanent members of the UNSC declared that both a positive and negative security assurance is 
only provided to "the party" to the NPT. But China's stance toward a positive security assurance is with little 
doubt due to the national statement that "China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any 
time or under any circumstances" (Letter dated 25 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the 
People's Republic of China to the United Nations and Deputy Head of the Chinese Delegation Addressed to 
the Secretary-General of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
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assurances; the right of individual or collective self-defence preserved under the UN Charter; and 
even "applicable international law, including international humanitarian law". 68  On nuclear 
disarmament, NWS already accept the "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish, in accordance with 
the principle of irreversibility, the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear 
disarmament … under article VI of the [NPT]".69 They may also voluntarily follow any action plans 
mentioned in the final documents of 1995, 2000 and 2010,70 due to the political status of these 
documents. The four permanent members of the UNSC (except China) apparently accept neither the 
ICJ's 1996 Advisory Opinion nor the 1996 and 2007 MNWCs.71 This is because their stance on the 
universalisation of the NPT endorses significant, rather than complete, nuclear disarmament. 
Specifically, in relation to art 6 of the NPT, the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia) 
have gradually been reducing their nuclear weapons capacity, through the 1987 Intermediate-Range 
  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.1995/26 (1995) at [1]); or "the unequivocal commitment 
that [China] will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon 
states or nuclear-weapon-free zones" (emphasis added) ("Statement by the Chinese Delegation on Nuclear 
Disarmament at the Thematic Debate at the First Committee of the 67th Session of UNGA" (19 October 
2012) Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and other International 
Organizations in Vienna <http://www.chinesemission-vienna>). On the other hand, the United Kingdom 
more clearly stated that a negative security assurance would not be provided to the party, even "if any 
beneficiary is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations": Letter dated 21 April 1995 from 
the Head of the Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.1995/24 (1995) at Appendix B. See also annexes of 
Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General S/1995/261 (1995); Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the 
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General S/1995/262 (1995); Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Chargé 
d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General S/1995/263 (1995); Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of 
France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General S/1995/264 (1995); Letter dated 6 April 
1995 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General 
S/1995/265 (1995); and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China "Fact Sheet: Nuclear 
Disarmament" (27 April 2004) <www.fmprc.gov.cn>. 
68  2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final 
Document NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol I) (2010) at 19. 
69  Ibid, at 12.  
70  See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons: Final Document, above n 58; 2000 NPT Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document, above n 58; and 2010 Review Conference 
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document, above n 68. 
71  Model Nuclear Weapons Convention A/C.1/52/7 (1997) [1996 MNWC]; 2007 MNWC, above n 7. 
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Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), 72  the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 1991 (START-I), 73  the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 1993 (START-II),74 the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty 2002 
(SORT),75 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 2010 (New START).76 Historically, each 
Preamble of the START treaties has expressed the following points: "nuclear war would have 
devastating consequences for all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never be fought" in 
START-I;77 taking "further progress … will help lay a solid foundation for a world order built on 
democratic values that would preclude the risk of outbreak of war" and simultaneously "[r]ecognizing 
their special responsibility as permanent members of the [UNSC] for maintaining international peace 
and security" in START-II;78 and, "endeavoring to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear 
weapons" and "the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat" in 
New START.79 Thus, the parties' political will towards achieving a NWFW is progressing. 
Among the NWS, only China has taken a different approach towards a NWFW. This is obviously 
seen in China's constant voting in favour of the UNGA resolutions following on from the ICJ's 1996 
Advisory Opinion on art 6 of the NPT that was proposed primarily by the NAM countries. China 
wants other NWS to limit their use of and reduce their stock of nuclear weapons in an equal manner.80 
  
72  Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination 
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, United States–Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
12101 TIAS (signed 8 December 1987, entered into force 1 June 1988). 
73  Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction 
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, United States–Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (signed 31 
July 1991, entered into force 5 December 1994) [START-I]. 
74  Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, United States–Russian Federation (signed 3 January 1993, not in 
force) [START-II]. 
75  Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 
United States–Russian Federation (signed 24 May 2002, entered into force 1 June 2003). 
76  Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, United States–Russian Federation (signed 8 April 
2010, entered into force 5 February 2011) [New START]. 
77  START-I, above n 73, at Preamble.  
78  START-II, above n 74, at Preamble.  
79  New START, above n 76, at Preamble. 
80  For instance, China "strongly calls for the early conclusion of an international convention on no-first-use of 
nuclear weapons" among the NWS (Letter dated 25 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the 
People's Republic of China, above n 67, at [3]), and states that "[t]he [United States] and Russia … 
possessing the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, bear special and primary responsibilities for nuclear 
disarmament" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China "Nuclear disarmament between 
the United States of America and Russian Federation" (2005) <www.fmprc.gov.cn>) and:  
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In a somewhat different capacity, China has been able to share its agenda of negotiating a nuclear 
weapons convention with these NWS. 
The allies of the NWS are taking almost the same stance as the four NWS (except China). They 
constantly request the NWS to take concrete steps and to undertake the action plans for nuclear 
disarmament mentioned in the final documents of the NPT Review Conferences. Nevertheless, they 
do not support the ICJ's 1996 Advisory Opinion due to it being negatively appraised as a political 
maneuver by the NAM countries, and likewise, the other four NWS.81 
Thus, the NWS and their allies – except China – are strictly following the NPT, and thereby taking 
a "step-by-step" approach towards a NWFW. 
B Non-Aligned Countries: Departing From the NPT 
Almost all of the NAM countries share an understanding that the use and possession of nuclear 
weapons by any country is generally illegal under international laws, specifically humanitarian 
laws.82 Those countries have tried to delegitimise a "step-by-step" approach based on the NPT, and 
replace it with an approach aimed at a universal and complete nuclear disarmament. Basically, the 
NAM countries share a common understanding that the NPT is "a kind of nuclear colonialism"83 and 
  
… the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan 
composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete 
prohibition of nuclear weapons.  
– "Statement by Counselor Zhang Junan of the Chinese Delegation on Nuclear Disarmament at the Thematic 
Debate at the First Committee of the 67th Session of UNGA" (18 October 2012) Permanent Mission of the 
People's Republic of China to the UN <www.china-un.org>. See also CTBT, above n 44, at Preamble. 
81  Germany requested the International Court of Justice's [ICJ] advisory opinion on the legality of the use and 
threat of nuclear weapons sponsored by the NAM countries. The reason for this was that "[the draft 
resolution] could … have wider adverse implications for non-proliferation goals which we all share". From 
the United States' point of view it was "an inappropriate use of the [ICJ] … for what can only be seen as 
political purposes": United Nations General Assembly Official Records: Forty-ninth session A/49/PV.90 
(1994) at 26. However, the Draft Resolution was barely adopted, with 78 votes in favour (the NAM 
countries), 43 votes against (the four NWS), 26 absent (the NWS allies), and 26 votes of non-action (China). 
82  At least before the 1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 3, was issued, almost all of the NAM countries shared an 
understanding that the use of nuclear weapons was not legitimised even in exercising the right of 
self-defence. India is a good example. See for example Letter dated 20 June 1995 from the Ambassador of 
India, together with Written Comments of the Government of India HAG/POL/443/2/95 (1995). 
83  Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request for Advisory Opinion 
Submitted by the World Health Organization) and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations): Verbatim Record 
CR/95/27 (1995) at 44. Malaysia also stated that accepting the NPT meant that they "would have to come to 
the frightening conclusion that international law is on the side of the powerful, as interpreted by the 
powerful" (at 47). As such, Malaysia's oral statement implies the shared common understanding of the NAM 
countries. 
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the genuine cause of nuclear proliferation84 and they even do not accept a positive security assurance 
with the use of nuclear weapons granted by the UNSC under ch VII of the UN Charter.85 With these 
understandings, the NAM countries unilaterally initiated a request to the ICJ for an advisory opinion 
on the legality of the use and threat of nuclear weapons in order to delegitimise the aforementioned 
"step-by-step" approach. This was achieved through the World Health Organization (WHO) 
Assembly Resolution passed in 1993 and the UNGA Resolution passed in 1994,86 by a simple 
majority vote. The main reason the countries took such a premature action at that time was because the 
NPT would be indefinitely extended; or alternatively, the dominant approach, namely the 
"step-by-step" approach would be fully legitimised in 1995. This attempt led to a controversial 
precedent in the UN system, because a simple majority of the UNGA can now use the ICJ's 
authoritative advice in order to delegitimise and evade the UNSC's decisions and efforts towards 
achieving a NWFW.87 
The 1996 Advisory Opinion apparently empowered the NAM's political endeavour, since it ruled 
that an obligation stipulated in art 6 of the NPT is a customary law,88 such that all States are required 
  
84  Ibid, at 44. Malaysia stated as follows:  
As long as [NWS] fail to commit to a time frame for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and for 
as long as four of the five nuclear-weapon States refuse even to give up the first use option, there 
is every possibility of further proliferation and of an enhanced risk of a nuclear conflagration that 
can threaten the planet and all of humanity.  
85  Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, above n 83, at 45. According to 
Malaysia:  
[A] submission of a [NWS] that each [NWS] can determine for itself when the use of nuclear 
weapons is appropriate … under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security 
Council can authorize the use of nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons can be used on 
[NNWS] … must be seriously alarmed over such a claim.  
86  See World Health Organization Resolution RES/46/40 (1993). It was also barely adopted with 73 votes in 
favour (the NAM countries), 40 votes against, with 10 absent. See also UNGA Resolution RES/49/75K 
(1994); United Nations General Assembly Official Records: Forty-ninth session, above n 81. 
87  In the case of the legality of the use and threat of nuclear weapons, whether the ICJ caused further 
disharmony between the UNSC and UNGA is debatable. Where there is a certain consensus between the 
UNSC and UNGA, the ICJ may contribute to resolve an international dispute on international peace and 
security effectively. 
88  See 1996 Advisory Opinion (Declaration of President Bedjaoui of Algeria), above n 3, at 273–274. The 
Costa Rica Government referred to this understanding in proposing the 2007 MNWC, above n 7: see Model 
Nuclear Weapons Convention: working paper submitted by Costa Rica NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.17 
(2007). However, all judges of the ICJ did not necessarily agree with President Bedjaoui's interpretation. For 
instance, ICJ Vice-President Schwebel (United States), expressed negativity toward the emergence of such 
customary law, stating that para 2F of the conclusion must be treated as "dictum" and "[i]f it applies to States 
not party to the NPT, it would be a dubious holding" (1996 Advisory Opinion (Dissenting Opinion of 
Vice-President Schwebel), above n 3, at 329). Aside from that, Judge Fleischhauer (Germany) indicated that 
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"to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all 
its aspects under strict and effective international control" because "the long-promised complete 
nuclear disarmament appear[ed] to be the most appropriate [solution]".89 Thus, the NAM States have 
repeatedly proposed the UNGA resolve as follows:90 
[To call] once again upon all States immediately to fulfill that obligation by commencing multilateral 
negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, 
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for 
their elimination [as a follow up of the advisory opinion]. 
Not only that, the NAM States were also empowered by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's 2008 
Five-Point Proposal on Nuclear Disarmament, which proposed to take further efforts towards nuclear 
disarmament through an "agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments … 
[o]r … a nuclear-weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification, as has long been 
proposed at the United Nations".91 The NAM States have emphasised that the final document of the 
2010 NPT Review Conference underscores the Secretary-General's Five-Point Proposal for 
legitimising their political endeavour.92 
Ironically, the 1996 Advisory Opinion also reinforced the aspirations of de facto NWS, such as 
India and the DPRK, to officially possess their nuclear weapons for self-defence. Although the NPT 
was indefinitely extended in 1995, the 1996 Advisory Opinion merely ruled that there is no 
"comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such", and 
although "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to … the principles and 
rules of humanitarian laws", it could not:93 
  
nuclear disarmament requires a comprehensive approach, stating that "the answer to the conflict … of the 
nuclear weapon … can only lie in effective reduction and control of nuclear armaments and an improved 
system of collective security" (1996 Advisory Opinion (Separate Opinion of Judge Fleischhauer), above n 3, 
at 310). 
89  1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 3, at 267 and 263. 
90  Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons GA Res 66/46, above n 4, at 3. 
91  Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations "The United Nations and Security in a 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free World" (Address to the East-West Institute, New York, 24 October 2008), also stated 
that the 2007 MNWC, above n 7, is "a good point of departure".  
92  2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, above n 
68, at 13 and 20. However, whether the final document actually referred to negotiating toward a nuclear 
weapons convention [NWC] as an "action" is doubted. 
93  1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 3, at 266 (emphasis added).  
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… conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an 
extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.  
It therefore seemed as though the 1996 Advisory Opinion was indirectly legitimising nuclear 
deterrence for all countries. For instance, according to the understanding India has held since 1998,94 
the possession of nuclear weapons is legitimised because India is a non-party to the NPT, and also the 
use of nuclear weapons is equally legitimised within the ambit of the right to self-defence under the 
UN Charter. Interestingly, General Sundarji of India, who enjoyed strong influence in policy-making 
at the time, clearly stated in 1996 that "[t]he [ICJ] has recently ruled that the possession of nuclear 
weapons is not illegal", and:95 
… there is therefore nothing sinful about India wanting to safeguard its national security or nothing illegal, 
or immoral about India wanting to keep a credible nuclear capability for use against an aggressor who 
might make first use of nuclear weapons against it.  
He further stated that "[i]f we need to test to establish the credibility of our nuclear deterrence 
capacity, let us do so".96 India may retain a so-called "credible minimum deterrence" position until 
non-discriminatory general and complete nuclear disarmament within the NWS is achieved.97 This 
fact implies that the 1996 Advisory Opinion actually furthered nuclear proliferation rather than 
nuclear disarmament, because it fundamentally ignored the significance of the NPT and UNSC 
resolutions. 
Against this backdrop, the MNWC, proposed by and accepted within the NAM countries, may be 
politically maneuvred not only to divert from a "step-by-step" approach based on the NPT but also to 
legitimise the de facto NWS. The MNWC would equally and comprehensively ban the use and threat 
of nuclear weapons, any nuclear tests, the manufacture and possession of weapon graded fissile 
materials, the deployment and development of ballistic missiles and so on, and invoke a time-bound 
  
94  India's official statement to the ICJ in 1995 mentioned that the use and threat of nuclear weapons is "illegal" 
and thus, for peace to be achieved, the weapons themselves should not be made: see Letter dated 20 June 
1995 from the Ambassador of India, together with Written Comments of the Government of India, above n 
82, at 5. 
95  General K Sundarji "Imperatives of Indian Minimum Nuclear Deterrence" (1996) 12 AGNI 17 at 17. 
96  Ibid, at 22. 
97  Former Minister of External Affairs of India, Pranab Mukherjee stated as follows in "Foreword: India 's 
Strategic Perspective" in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (eds) Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and 
Opportunities (Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2007) 21 at 23:   
India's nuclear deterrence is a measure of self-defence in a hostile and nuclearised environment. 
Its nuclear doctrine emphasises no first use, non-use against non-nuclear weapon states, a 
voluntary moratorium on testing and credible minimum deterrence. India has been, and remains, 
a staunch advocate of nuclear disarmament. 
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and phased nuclear disarmament, under a strong international verification system. Thus, the MNWC 
approach can be termed an "Incremental-Comprehensive Approach" towards a NWFW.98  The 
MNWC problematically tries to introduce a new State category called "Nuclear Capable States" 
(NCS), meaning "a State which has developed or has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons and 
which is not party to the [NPT]".99 As per the Special Provision of the MNWC, the NCS may be 
allowed to take "temporary retention of small and diminishing quantities of nuclear weapons",100 if 
the Executive Council decided such an action was acceptable by a two-thirds majority vote. Further, 
the NCS "shall follow the requirements, guidelines and phases … [but] … shall not be expected to 
implement the provisions of this Convention in advance of other States Parties", probably the 
NWS.101 This structure implies that the MNWC may depart from mainstream views on nuclear 
non-proliferation by legitimising the de facto NWS.102 In addition, the MNWC may not allow a 
positive security assurance even by the UNSC because it should "emphasize compliance over 
  
98  International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, International Network of Engineers and 
Scientists Against Proliferation, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War Securing Our 
Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007) at 
27–29. 
99  See 2007 MNWC, above n 7, at art 2(A)(2). In addition, the nuclear threshold States, "which [desire] to 
become party to the Convention and are known to possess or have credibly declared that they possess nuclear 
weapons", was originally proposed in the 1996 MNWC, above n 71. Thus, there is a doubt that the change 
was made to match the present situation of de facto NWS, such as exists in India, Pakistan and probably the 
DPRK.  
100  2007 MNWC, above n 7, at arts 4(E)(12) and 8(C)(29). In addition, as is the structure of the Executive 
Council, all council members are equally entitled to one vote. Thus, first, NWS do not have veto rights, and 
second, their and their allies' support of the NPT may not be well represented due to the two-thirds majority 
voting system, and:  
… due regard being paid to equitable geographic distribution, to representation by 
nuclear-capable states and to the interests of all states to be free from the threat of nuclear 
devastation [in electing the member]. 
See 2007 MNWC, above n 7, at art 8(C)(23). 
101  2007 MNWC, above n 7, at art 4(E)(13). 
102  This provision may imply that de facto NWS that are not yet party to the NPT may not unilaterally disarm 
their nuclear weapons capacity prior to nuclear disarmament by the NWS. Indeed, an Indian high official, D 
Bala Venkatesh Verma, has stated that India can support the MNWC unless it does not have a relationship 
with the NPT. This information is based on a personal interview with D Bala Venkatesh Verma, Joint 
Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (16 March 2012). See also the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear 
Policy Nuclear Weapons Convention: Commentary on the MNWC (April 1997) at Introduction, which 
clearly explained that "[a]n overriding principle guiding the drafting has been the search for a regime … 
sufficiently permissive to allow states to join without jeopardizing their legitimate security interests". It also 
further stated at pt II(A) that "a special provision … aims to accommodate the concerns of threshold States 
seeking to participate in the NWC regime, without referring to them as threshold States," and "not including 
[the States to the regime] might perpetuate the "two-tier" system of the [NPT]". 
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[coercive] enforcement [as a sanction of the collective security]"103 and not allow any violation of 
humanitarian laws.104 
Thus, the NAM's understanding of nuclear disarmament is very radical and obviously departs 
from the NPT. It would be highly problematic in the international community if States thought that 
some NAM countries' retention of nuclear weapons was not an obstacle in the path towards a NWFW. 
The proposed MNWC, if adopted as the official convention, might legitimise nuclear proliferation and 
make a nuclear disarmament negotiation more complex and difficult.105 
IV CURRENT SITUATION: DISHARMONY BETWEEN THE UNSC 
AND UNGA? 
If the primacy of the UNSC under the UN Charter is accepted,106 it is a logical consequence that 
any UNGA resolution not in harmony with the UNSC may not be well reflected. Putting this matter 
aside, this Part briefly captures the current position of nuclear disarmament under the UN system, 
focusing on the UNSC and UNGA resolutions. 
A UNSC: Enforcing Nuclear Non-Proliferation as a Step Towards a 
NWFW 
Since the NPT was adopted, the UNSC has maintained a nuclear non-proliferation regime and 
supported the IAEA safeguard system for international peace and security. In adopting Resolution 418 
  
103  International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, above n 98, at 109. 
104  Ibid. But, at the San Francisco Conference on the Charter of the UN, held in 1945, the United States opposed 
a proposal trying "to restrict the freedom of the [UNSC] … by reference to principles of international law or 
justice," "on the grounds that … the [UNSC] should not be hampered by detailed direction of its activities", 
and eventually such claim was accepted at the Conference: Secretary of State of the United States of America 
Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States 
Delegation, the Secretary of State (26 June 1945) at 105 and 111–112. This indicates doubt as to whether the 
UNSC's enforcement activity must inevitably be bound by humanitarian laws and so on.  
105  According to the Government of Costa Rica, the proposed MNWC is "a guide" to the multilateral 
negotiations leading to a NWC, and thus "an actual negotiated [convention] … might be similar to some 
aspects of the [MNWC] and differ in other aspects": 2007 MNWC, above n 7. But, due to the fact that the text 
of the 2007 MNWC itself explains (at 4) that "[t]he drafters do … believe that this Model demonstrates the 
feasibility and practicality of nuclear disarmament", only minor changes that are not fundamentally contrary 
to the interests of the NAM counties might be allowed.  
106  According to James D Fry "Early Security Council Efforts at Nuclear Non-Proliferation Law and Policy: 
Cooperation Forgotten" (2012) 21 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs 337 (forthcoming):  
There is no mention in the U.N. Charter of how the [UNSC] and [UNGA] are to coordinate their 
activities in the realm of disarmament and arms control in general or nuclear non-proliferation in 
particular … [but] the U.N. Charter is designed to give [the UNSC] the lead on [these matters].  
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under ch VII of the UN Charter,107 the UNSC expressed a grave concern that "South Africa is at the 
threshold of producing nuclear weapons"108 and decided that "all States shall refrain from any 
co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons".109 Aside 
from that, in the case of "the premeditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations" which was 
subject to the IAEA full scope safeguards, the UNSC condemned Israel, saying that "the said attack 
constitutes a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards regime which is the foundation of the 
[NPT]" since "the Agency has testified that these safeguards have been satisfactorily applied to 
date".110 Further, in Resolution 825, "emphasizing the integral role of IAEA safeguards in the 
implementation of the [NPT]", the UNSC called upon "the DPRK to … comply with its safeguards 
agreement" due to the IAEA Board of Governor's finding of the DPRK's "non-compliance" with the 
agreement.111 
In the post-Cold War era, the UNSC has aggressively enforced nuclear non-proliferation 
standards with a view towards achieving a NWFW supported by the members of the UN – even 
members that are non-parties to the NPT or non-signatories to the CTBT. The UNSC has strengthened 
the non-proliferation regime under the NPT standards after deciding in 1992 that the proliferation of 
WMD is a "threat to international peace and security".112 This dramatic momentum was created 
when Iraq's violation of the NPT was discovered after the 1991 Gulf War and the UN Special 
Commission was established to unilaterally disarm Iraq's WMD capacity under UNSC Resolution 
687.113 Momentum was further strengthened by two NWS' accessions to the NPT; those of France 
and China in 1992. The 1995 Review Conference decision to indefinitely extend the NPT,114 and also 
to adopt the CTBT in the UNGA in 1996, were further catalysts. In such an international situation, the 
UNSC became very much responsible for proliferation matters. For instance, India's, Pakistan's and 
the DPRK's nuclear tests for self-defence were penalised, and Iran was also penalised by the UNSC 
  
107  Resolution 418 (1977) SC Res 418, S/Res/418 (1977). 
108  Ibid, at Preamble. 
109  Resolution 418 (1977), above n 107, at [4]. Interestingly, this resolution even called upon "[the] States 
non-members of the [UN]" to "act strictly" the same as all member States (at [5]) (emphasis added). Later, 
South Africa acceded to the NPT on 10 July 1991. 
110  Resolution 487 (1981) SC Res 487 (1981), S/Res/487 (1981) at Preamble and [3]. Further, in the same 
Resolution, at [5], the UNSC called upon Israel who "has not adhered to the [NPT]", "urgently to place its 
nuclear facilities under [the] IAEA safeguards". 
111  Resolution 825 SC Res 825, S/Res/825 (1993) at [2]. 
112  Note by the President of the Security Council S/23500 (1992) at 4. 
113  Resolution 687 (1991) SC Res 687, S/Res/687 (1991). 
114  Decision 3: Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.1995/32 
(1995) Part I at Annex.  
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due to its violations of the NPT and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.115 In addition, the UNSC 
adopted (under ch VII of the UN Charter), the so-called "law-making" resolution that directed all 
members of the UN to enact national laws to prevent the proliferation of WMD by non-State actors 
under the 1540 Committee's Observation.116 
The UNSC adoption of Resolution 1887, led by President Obama, is a historical evolution in the 
movement toward nuclear disarmament. It is unique in that it calls upon:117 
… all States that are not Parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty as [NNWS] so as to achieve its 
universality at an early date, and pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms.  
It also asks those States "to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the 
[CTBT], thereby bringing the treaty into force at an early date".118 This means that the UNSC 
requests all members of the UN to de facto, or quasi de jure if the permanent members deem it so, 
adhere to the treaty regardless of it not being acceded to or even not entering into force. Additionally, 
Resolution 1887 apparently follows a "step-by-step" approach, stating in the Preamble that a NWFW 
should be achieved in accordance with the NPT. Further, due to the fact that "the statements by each 
of the five [NWS], noted by [UNSC] resolution 984"119 are also recalled, the resolution might be 
based on an understanding that the collective security system, backed by a positive security assurance 
of using nuclear weapons, is necessary until the NPT is universally adhered to as an inevitable step 
towards a NWFW for the UNSC. The attitude of the UNSC in enforcing nuclear non-proliferation 
gives a hint as to the reason why the 1996 Advisory Opinion and the 2007 MNWC are completely 
ignored in Resolution 1887. If this is the case, are the UNSC and UNGA in grave disharmony? 
  
115  By adopting Resolution 1696 (2006) SC Res 1696, S/Res/1696 (2006) in the UNSC, Iran begun to be 
penalised, due to the fact that the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution Implementation of the NPT 
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran GOV/2006/14 (2006) stated, at [g], that Iran had 
"many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the absence 
of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes". Before that, Resolution 
1540 (2004), above n 38, clearly stated in its Preamble that "goals of peaceful utilization should not be used 
as a cover for proliferation". Currently, the latest IAEA Report of the Director-General Implementation of the 
NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran GOV/2012/37 (2012) – mentioning that Iran's continuous expansion of its uranium enrichment 
activities and several possible military dimensions – appears to be fully supported by the permanent members 
of the UNSC. 
116  Resolution 1540 (2004), above n 38. 
117  Resolution 1887 (2009), above n 5, at [4].  
118  Resolution 1887 (2009), above n 5, at [7].  
119  Resolution 1887 (2009), above n 5, at [9]. 
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B UNGA: Two Main Streams Towards a NWFW 
According to the UN Charter, the UNGA is vested with an authority to make recommendations 
(though not binding on the members of the UN),120 on "the principles governing disarmament and the 
regulation of armaments … to the Members or to the [UNSC] or to both".121 Indeed, UNGA 
Resolution 2373, which adopted the NPT:122  
… requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the [NWS] urgently 
to pursue negotiations on … a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.  
What kind of trend is visible within the UNGA at present must be investigated, without regard to the 
issue of whether and which resolutions concerning nuclear disarmament can be recognised as 
evidence of the emergence of a customary law or not. 
Two main streams, the contra-NPT approach and the pro-NPT approach, are recognisable up to 
the present day. The former approach is seen in the follow-up resolutions to the 1996 ICJ Advisory 
Opinion,123 proposed by 52 countries (mainly the NAM countries). The latter approach is seen in the 
Resolution on United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,124 led by Japan and 
proposed by 99 countries, including the United States and their allies. Indeed, during the 2011 UNGA 
session, the former resolution obtained 130 votes in favour (mainly the NAM countries and China) 
and 26 votes against the motion (the four NWS and others), while 23 abstained (Japan and others).125 
  
120  But, the ICJ stated in 1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 3, at 254–255, that:  
[UNGA] resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative value … in 
certain circumstances [in which] evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or 
the emergence of an opinio juris [is recognised].  
Although the ICJ examined a possibility of lex lata on the illegality of use of nuclear weapons through these 
resolutions, they eventually failed to find it since "the adoption each year by the [UNGA], by a large 
majority, of resolutions recalling the content of resolution 1653 (XVI)" and "to take … by a specific and 
express prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a significant step forward along the road to complete 
nuclear disarmament" was not sufficient for it (1996 Advisory Opinion, above n 3, at 255). This logic 
somewhat implies that the UNGA resolutions concerning nuclear disarmament, including the Follow-up 
Resolution[s] to the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion, have little impact in the UN system. 
121  UN Charter, above n 36, at arts 11 and 1.  
122  Resolution 2373, above n 49, at Preamble. In addition, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 
Disarmament is now the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, having expanded to 65 members. 
123  See above n 4. 
124  Resolution on United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons GA Res 66/45, A/Res/66/45 
(2012). 
125  United Nations General Assembly Official Records: 71st Plenary Meeting A/66/PV.71 (2011) at 27–28. 
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On the other hand, the latter resolution obtained 169 votes in favour and one against, while 11 
abstained.126 The latter resolution emphasised the necessity of retaining a "step-by-step" approach by 
"fully implementing the action plan agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference"127 and taking the 
actions as stipulated in UNSC Resolution 1887.128 But it did not explicitly mention the 1996 Advisory 
Opinion and the 2007 MNWC, both of which decisively contradict the former resolution. This implies 
that the trend of nuclear disarmament in the UNGA at present is contributing to greater harmony with 
the UNSC. However, it is fair to say that the disharmony may not be fully diminished unless the latter 
resolution can obtain a vote of favour, in real terms, from some influential NAM countries who 
severely doubt a "step-by-step" approach and also have the potential to block the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva.129 
V CONCLUSION: REASSESSMENT OF THE CAUSES OF 
DEADLOCK, AND SOLUTIONS 
In this article, the roles of the UN system and NPT in the nuclear disarmament process were 
briefly examined. The history of the LON clearly shows us that failures of disarmament were caused 
by the consensus procedure; by the member States claiming sovereign equality and self-defence in 
order to evade a discriminatory disarmament; and by the lack of an effective sanction mechanism for 
arms control. On the other hand, the UN system as a collective force for security has a strong 
mechanism for arms control backed by the five permanent members of the UNSC. These facts hint 
that any UNGA resolution and ICJ advisory opinion that is in disharmony with the UNSC may not be 
well represented in the UN system, and it might not bring about a good outcome for disarmament per 
se. Indeed, and ironically, the 1996 Advisory Opinion, which supported equal disarmament and 
equally allowing the use and threat of nuclear weapons under the right of self-defence, furthered the 
nuclear proliferation of some emerging and developing countries, thus evading the non-proliferation 
obligations of the NNWS. The 2007 MNWC, reflecting the 1996 Advisory Opinion, may legitimise 
  
126  The voting pattern was as follows: 169 votes in favour (four NWS and their allies); 1 vote against (DPRK); 
and 11 absent (Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Iran, Israel, Mauritius, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria). See 
ibid, at 24–27. 
127  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan "2011 the United Nation General Assembly Resolution: 'United action 
towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons'" (December 2011) <www.mofa.go.jp>. 
128  It seems as though the resolution has a clear consistency with Resolution 1887 (2009), above n 5. See also 
ibid. 
129  India, in explaining their reasons of voting for General and complete disarmament: united action towards the 
total elimination of nuclear weapons A/C.1/66/L.41 (2011), stated that the country remains dedicated to "the 
goal of global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework". See 
India's official statement "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (26 October 2011) 
<www.reachingcriticalwill.org>. 
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the actions of these States. This means that we must remain strongly supportive of nuclear arms 
control backed by the UNSC's decision to work towards a NWFW. 
Although the sharp conflict in understanding of international law relating to nuclear disarmament 
between the NWS and their allies and the NAM countries might not cease soon, it is being minimised, 
even in the UNGA. Evidently, emphasising "a step-by-step" approach based on the NPT and UNSC 
Resolution 1887, avoiding mention of the 1996 Advisory Opinion and the 2007 MNWC, is 
overwhelmingly gaining acceptance. We can expect to see a kind of "good synergy" between the 
UNSC and UNGA towards achieving a NWFW. 
Finally, this analysis may contribute to the reshaping of a reasonable balance of nuclear 
disarmament approaches in the UN system, premised on two conditions: first, immediately 
establishing a well-balanced decision-making procedure for the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva, so as to revive a disarmament procedure led by the UNSC (as Hans Kelsen proposed); and 
second, never accepting the possession of nuclear weapons by any NNWS under the NPT. In testing 
the second chance to achieve a NWFW, strict enforcement of the maintenance of nuclear 
non-proliferation – that is, pursuing complete universalisation of the NPT as a regulation of "nuclear" 
armaments of the UN system – would establish a strong basis for furthering nuclear disarmament 
negotiations and measures among the NWS. The UNSC permanent members that are the NWS 
already promised that a NWFW would be pursued in accordance with the NPT and under positive and 
negative security assurances to the NPT parties. Thus, we now need a strong will to never depend on 
nuclear weapons, which might be achieved by expanding and strengthening the NWFZ and inspection 
systems of the IAEA and CTBT, and accepting further centralisation of force within the UN's 
collective security system.130 
  
  
130  The Preamble of the Constitution of Japan (3 November 1946) stipulates that the Japanese people "preserve 
[their own] security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world", 
and respecting "the right to live in peace, free from fear and want" which "all peoples of the world have". 
Article 9 of the Constitution clearly stipulates that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign 
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes", and thus "land, 
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained".  
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